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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:33:01 GMT
It's at Hillsborough and you open the match programme to see a picture of the Leppings Lane end of the ground full of Liverpool supporters, same round, same place.
One year ago in 1988.
The programme reads: "As you look around Hillsborough you will appreciate why it has been regarded for so long as the perfect venue for all kinds of important matches. It is a stadium that befits such occasions and the large crowds they attract".
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:38:51 GMT
Liverpool had reached the semi-final of the FA Cup and were to play Nottingham Forest at the Hillsborough Stadium, home to Sheffield Wednesday Football Club. It was an identical scenario to the previous year when Liverpool had beaten Notts Forest at the same ground.
Tickets are always in short demand for such a game but in this instance Liverpool fans had even scarcer resources to draw from. They had been located the Leppings Lane end of the ground - the smaller end. Given the level of support this was a woefully inadequate allocation of tickets. Although there was general disquiet about this decision by the FA's, fans nevertheless resigned themselves to the fact. After all they had been through it all the year before and therefore many justifiably felt that they knew what to expect.
Fans set off early and full of optimism on that sunny Saturday morning. Whether they had travelled by road or rail, having left their transport at designated sites they were escorted by police towards the ground. One bereaved father described the areas around the ground as having a 'carnival atmosphere'. Sadly, this atmosphere would soon change.
The build up of fans around the Leppings Lane area increased dramatically around 2p.m. as people began to arrive in greater numbers. It also became known that many coaches were only just arriving having experienced delays from road works and police searches along the way. Clearly a crowd safety issue was emerging. Yet police records indicate little real concern at this stage.
From 2.30p.m. the number of people at the turnstile area was immense and orderly queuing was an impossibility. Fans being searched as they went in to the ground exacerbated this growing problem. Fans were entering a bottleneck. 10,000 fans, three gates, and seven turnstiles - this was the disastrous situation that people with tickets for the Leppings Lane end were walking into. Add to this the number of people with tickets for the West Stand (located above the terracing) who also had to enter by the same three gates and the recipe for disaster increases even further.
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:40:06 GMT
The Police Response
Superintendent Marshall was in overall command outside the ground. His record of the day reveals a heavy emphasis on the amount of alcohol being consumed by Liverpool fans. This emphasis was to become the main observation of the police version of events of the day and was the opposite of fans recollections and subsequent forensic evidence.
As conditions worsened fans were increasingly distressed. Those on the inside were struggling to breathe as the numbers swelled. Whilst on the outside the volume of those trying to enter at the Leppings lane end increased by the minute. An officer requested that the kick - off be delayed in order to reassure the crowd that there was no urgency. The request was denied. An inspector asked that the exit gates be opened in order to relieve the pressure outside. Marshall was reluctant to take this course of action because it would allow uncontrolled access to the stadium.
Fans accounts of the scenes outside the Leppings lane area point almost universally to a lack of organisation and control. Trapped in a bottleneck, quite literally, they had nowhere to go except where the momentum of the crowd led them. The fear of fans caught in this situation outside can only be matched by those struggling to survive on the inside.
Eventually Marshall radioed through to Chief Superintendent Duckenfield who was in overall command on the day (despite the fact that he had minimal experience of policing football and absolutely no experience of such a big game) and requested that the exit gates be opened. Duckenfield hesitated (he would later give evidence stating that he 'froze') but eventually gave the order: 'Open the gates'.
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:41:05 GMT
The Consequences of Opening Gate 'C' Once gate C had been opened police directed fans through the gate. The most obvious entrance to the terraces was through the tunnel opposite into pens 3 and 4. Evidence would later be given that in previous years police and/or stewards would stand at the entrance to the tunnel if these central pens had reached capacity and would direct fans to the side pens.
In 1989 however, no such direction took place as fans headed innocently into already overcrowded pens. It is quite incomprehensible that Duckenfield, failed to follow up the order to open gate C with instructions to allow for the swift increase in the volume of people entering that end of the ground. Indeed the reasoning capacity of Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield has to be seriously challenged when one considers his response to the situation in pens 3 and 4. Logic would inform the average person that the volume outside would be replicated inside once entrance was allowed and that therefore swift monitoring and control would be necessary if a catastrophe was to be averted. Logic however, does not seem to figure large in the consciousness of David Duckenfield. His response to seeing people spill out onto the perimeter track from the crushing in the pens was to call for reinforcements (including dog handlers) as he thought there was a pitch invasion!
This response of Duckenfield is even more obscene when it is realised that from his position in the control box he could clearly see the Leppings Lane end. Moreover, he had the advantage of CCTV with zoom facilities. His later testimony that he was unaware that people were suffering and dying becomes totally unbelievable to those of us who have visited that control box and know that it is possible see the colour of a persons eyes in pens 3 and 4 such was the power of the zoom facilities on the cameras. On the basis of his response given the carnage that could clearly be seen several theories have been postulated:
Duckenfield lacks the ability to reason at a very basic humanitarian level and therefore one has to ask does this reflect on the general standard of senior policing in Britain today. Duckenfield was totally indifferent to the situation he was witnessing in the pens and ignored the plight of dying people.Duckenfield was not in the control box at all, in which case where was he?
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:44:18 GMT
The Immediate Aftermath
In any analysis of the Hillsborough Disaster it is important to consider the immediate aftermath as it is at this point that crucial mistakes were made in terms of saving lives and also in dealing with people in the early stages of an unfolding Disaster. At Hillsborough the mistakes which led to the Disaster were further compounded by the response of many of the official agencies. What follows is a brief analysis of the responses of those most involved on that fateful day.
1. The Police Response It can be argued that to refer to a police response is something of a misnomer and it would be more appropriate to refer to 'the lack of a police response'. Both eye witness and visual evidence clearly shows the poor reaction of the police to an emerging disaster. It shows that their training had centred around crowd control as opposed to crowd safety. There can be no other explanation as to why senior officers failed to respond to the obvious distress of so many and subsequently why police formed a cordon across the halfway line when fans were ripping down hoardings to use as make shift stretchers to ferry the dead and injured. At one point when a perimeter gate opened under the force of the crush several fans managed to get out yet officers on duty at that point literally pushed them back in. Later at the resumed inquests those officers would give evidence affirming this fact. Even with hindsight they displayed no remorse for their actions. Of course the real issue here is the training of these officers as clearly they either ignored or failed to recognise the obvious distress of those just feet away from them.
The officer in charge on the day was in a control room that looked onto the Leppings Lane terracing. It also had the benefit of TV cameras with zoom facilities. To this day the ability of this officer has been questioned. Not only would he have been able to see the scene at the Leppings Lane end with the naked eye but he also had the added advantage of zoom facilities so powerful that it was possible to see the colour of a persons' eyes. There are those that have argued that the only rational reason for his lack of action was that he was not in the control room at all…. He was later to give evidence saying that he 'froze'. This begs the question why was such an inexperienced (although senior) officer put in charge of such a major event? Even when he realised that something was wrong his response was to send for reinforcements (including dog handlers) as if he had a crowd control situation!
The entire police response to the Hillsborough Disaster was appalling. Even though there were individual officers who assisted in attempting to save lives, nevertheless at an organisational level the police failed not just miserably but disastrously and (in the eyes of many) criminally. How else can the response be justified? Why did police push fans back into the pens? Why were dog handlers sent for? Why was a cordon of police formed across the halfway line? Why did police stand around doing nothing while fans rushed to save live? To summarise, why was there such a waste of valuable human resources at such a vital time?
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:45:29 GMT
The Immediate Aftermath - 2. The Fans Response The reaction of the Liverpool fans to the Disaster can be summed up in one word - exemplary. Their response was by far the more normal one to a disaster i.e. they tried to help those most at need. Although most were ill- equipped to assist in first aid they did everything they could even though many of them had just escaped from the crush and were themselves injured. They helped fellow fans out of the crush, ferried the injured and dying across the pitch on make shift stretchers whilst pleading with the police for assistance. They had to run past police and break through a police cordon to get the injured to ambulances. These fans who acted so heroically were the same fans who would later be accused of breaking down the gate, rushing in and crushing their fellow fans to death. The same fans who would be accused of pick - pocketing from the dead and urinating on police officers who were 'attempting to save lives'.
There can be no greater testimony to the fans than that which comes from those whose lives they saved and the bereaved families who truly recognise their heroism. Many of the bereaved managed to trace fans who assisted in trying to save their loved ones and were afforded a high degree of comfort from knowing how they had tried to save their lives. Every time the lies re-emerge, hard as is it is the fans should close their ears to the lies and instead be comforted by the gratitude afforded to them by those who truly know what they did on that day.
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:46:37 GMT
The Immediate Aftermath - 3. The Emergency Services
Prior to 1986 there had been no Ambulance Service representatives routinely at the Hillsborough ground. It was only after the Bradford Stadium Fire that South Yorkshire Ambulance Service (SYMAS), effectively forced the issue and offered cover through a revised emergency plan in respect of preventing any future disasters.
It was agreed in conjunction with the police and fire service that there would be two vehicles available on match days, one at the ground and one a mile away. Sheffield Wednesday agreed that SYMAS could have two free match tickets for games. This meant that there would be two ambulance officers in the ground. The fact that these tickets were located close to the players tunnel might lead some to question that Sheffield Wednesdays' concern was more for their players in an emergency than for the public. Surely the seats should have been close to the designated emergency area i.e. the Gymnasium?
Of the two officers present at the ground one responded to the emerging disaster by radioing through to central control and requesting a second standby ambulance and informing control that he was dealing with a "minor incident" at the ground.
The Major Accident Vehicle was not sent for until 3.29 p.m. Why?
This was the vehicle that was equipped to deal with major incidents. Even when it did arrive it could not get onto the pitch because of structural changes in the ground and those in charge did not want to damage the vehicle!
Although the Superintendent at Headquarters realised that whatever was unfolding needed a greater response and sent in more ambulances, sadly they were not utilised to their full use and indeed access to the major scene of the Disaster was delayed. There have been serious criticisms levelled at the ambulance service particularly in respect of triage. Dr John Ashton, a Liverpool supporter present on the day and who assisted in the rescue stated:
"They weren't putting people in any order. They weren't discriminating."
Medical personnel who assisted in a voluntary capacity were in the main highly critical of the lack of organised response. One Doctor commented:
"Like Dr Ashton I found no one in charge and spent the major amount of my time trying to sort out the seriously hurt from those already dead, or those with minor injuries."
Dr Ashton asserted that there was only one ambulance at the Leppings Lane end by 3.30 p.m.. This was of course disputed by SYMAS who went to great lengths to organise the evidence of their officers before the inquiry i.e. employing their own solicitor to take statements. Over time some officers have broken ranks and been critical of the role of the ambulance service on that day. Some officers have left the service. One of the senior officers involved on the day has been dismissed in respect of fraud allegations and one of the officers present at the ground as the Disaster unfolded has been moved into a civilian post following a drink driving charge.
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:48:51 GMT
The Immediate Aftermath - 4. The Gymnasium The gymnasium was the designated site at the Hillsborough ground for first aid. The criticisms levelled at this area are into those in charge and who treated people so insensitively.
Before the game the gymnasium was being used as an area for refreshments for the police. Evidence of those involved at the gymnasium immediately after the Disaster indicates that the chaos on the pitch was mirrored at the gymnasium. There was a distinct lack of co - ordination and direction in the short term. Bodies were laid out at random and medical personnel had to search through people to look for those who might till be alive. They were frustrated in their rescues attempts by a lack of equipment. One nurse commented on how she could not find scissors to cut an injured man's jumper in order to carry out a tracheotomy. She was eventually given a blunt knife by a police officer. A nurse manager who had been frustrated in his rescue attempts on the pitch by lack of equipment found a similar situation in the gymnasium:
"Another scene of chaos… I began to work with the injured in the gymnasium at around 15.55 hours. I was conscious of around three doctors in attendance, but when I arrived there was still no medical equipment of any sort."
A doctor who attended at the gymnasium in response to an appeal for help stated:
"There were bodies everywhere. Who was alive and who was dead?… Bodies lying higgledly-piggledy just inside the door, the line stretching over to the far wall. … Who was going to tell me what to do? Without directions I ran along the lines of crumpled bodies."
After the injured were removed the gymnasium became the temporary mortuary. Even the dead in the hospitals were returned there for identification purposes. This decision has been heavily criticised. Yet the Detective Superintendent of South Yorkshire C.I.D. who claims to have made the decision stated his reasons:
"I saw it as an ideal situation, if you don't mind me saying, to put all the eggs in one basket."
This rather unfortunate analogy is further compounded by the evidence of a senior ambulance officer who disputes this fact. He stated that The Det. Supt. Initially arranged to have all the bodies in the gymnasium transferred to the Medico-legal Centre before 6 p.m. on the Saturday evening. It was estimated that all bodies would be at the Centre by 7 p.m. However, it was the Coroner (in whose jurisdiction the bodies were in) who decide that the formal identification process should be undertaken at the gymnasium. This dispute as to who made the decision serves to highlight not only the initial confusion but also the emerging cover up as unacceptable decisions were rationalised.
The gymnasium was divided into three. An area for the dead, an area which accomodated police officers, and an area for statement taking and counselling. Meanwhile those waiting to identify bodies sat outside on buses having been transported from the boys club and the hospitals. Polaroid photographs of the dead were numbered and placed on boards. Those searching for the missing were shown the photographs. If they recognised a photograph, they gave the number and then the corresponding body was brought to them. Having identified the body the person was then taken to a table and interviewed by the police. Although this was supposed to be the identification procedure it was also the beginnings of a criminal investigation. Literally minutes after identifying their loved ones, the bereaved were being asked how many pubs they had visited before the match!
The effect of the identification process and immediate investigation had a profound effect on people. There was no attempt at grouping the photographs so for example if someone was looking for a female they were still subject to looking through all the photographs. In one case a young man who had come across his wife dead on the pitch and had accompanied her body to the gymnasium still had to go through the ridiculous procedure of being transported to the boys club, waiting and then going back to the gymnasium were he was forced to look through all the photographs were he would find what he already knew to be there - a photograph of his dead wife. Another man who had given a very accurate description of his son to a police officer at the gymnasium in the afternoon only to be told that his son was not there had to go through the same procedure. He was quite literally sent round in a circle from the gymnasium to the hospitals, to the boys' club and back to the gymnasium: He stated:
"It was so hard to look at the photographs because you were looking at faces and praying to God that Chris [his son] wasn't there."
Sadly Barry Devonsides' son, Christopher, was there and his body was brought to his father in a body bag:
"They brought Chris on a trolley. He was in a bag. I walked through. They unzipped the bag and said, 'would you look down?' "
Immediately he had identified Christopher, Barry felt an arm on him and he was led away to a table where what can only be described as an interrogation began. Although this was supposed to be the identification process, this poor father minutes after identifying his dead son was being asked how many pubs they had stopped off at and how much alcohol they had consumed. This was not an isolated incident. This is how people were treated generally in the gymnasium.
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:50:10 GMT
There are so many harrowing stories told by families of their experiences. Retold here is the account of the mother of James Delaney (as told on the Channel 4 programme After Dark and first printed in Hillsborough and After:The Liverpool Experience. Coleman S et al).
"A social worker took us to the ground where our son was killed, and for my husband and I it was a terrible thing that we were taken where James was killed. As far as we were concerned we feel that they didn't give, not only our son, but the other ninety four poor people who were killed, they didn't give them any dignity…surely they could have taken all those poor people including our son either to a church, to a school…covered them, even if it was only a white paper sheet… When we got to the ground we had to look at these photographs to try and identify our son. We looked and looked, we couldn't recognise our son… eventually we did see our son… so we were led into the sports hall and when we walked in our son was lying on a trolley, inside this green zipped-up bag, number thirty- three, so his dad and I bent down to kiss and to talk to James, and as we stood up, there was a policeman who came from behind me and was trying to usher myself and my husband out, straight out of the hall. The total attitude was, you've identified number thirty-three, so go! So unfortunately…I went hysterical, I'm afraid to say, I had to ask if I could take our son away from the public's eye, again there was poor people, unfortunate people like ourselves being ushered into the hall and our James was there, in the public's eye, people looking down at his poor face. I also had to scream at these officers and ask them please to allow us privacy for the three of us to be together…thankfully the policemen pulled James over to another part of the hall… I started to examine my son's body, he had blood in his nostrils, blood in his teeth, his poor face was hardened with blood on the side of his cheek. His face was dirty, his hair was very, dirty and dusty…And in the meantime I was examining our son …My husband was ushered to a table to be asked questions. At which again I started to scream… I know these questions have got to be asked but as far as I was concerned there is a time and a place for everything… I thought it was only right that his dad should be with him - we went together to look for our son James, and that was time that was owed to us, because at the end of the day, when you carry a child for nine months, and you bring them into the world, it is your right to be with your child. We asked if we could possibly - we wanted to stay with James - we were told 'no' that we couldn't. So I asked if we could be allowed to come back to see James - we were told 'no' it was for identification only."
This control over the deceased continued over the next few days. Mrs Delaney continued her story:
"We went home to see our other children. James' sister Catherine wanted to come back to see her brother. We went to this medical centre we had to sit ver three hours…When we finally got to see our son James we weren't allowed any privacy. James was behind a glass screen - we weren't allowed to touch or kiss James, and when I mentioned to the doctor, why weren't we allowed to kiss and touch our own son and the reply was, when the autopsy's done you can touch and kiss your son as much as you like. We weren't asked about the autopsy …we were told."
James was finally brought home to his family. However, his family's distress was added to because of the condition of his body:
"At the end of the day when we eventually got our son home on the Wednesday… we brought James home to the warmth of his own house, before that we weren't even allowed to visit our son… if we were allocated half an hour each day it would have been some consolation to us. We were sitting in Ellesmere Port, our son was down in Hillsborough - our hearts were eaten away for the fact that he was lying there on his own. When we got our son home, our son was completely stripped of his dignity. Our son's head had a hole in the back of his skull, his top teeth were taken away from him, his chest was completely padded. I examined my son like I did when I went to see him the first time. That again is a mother's or father's right to do so."
Although difficult to read for the harrowing description it is the belief of many that testimonies such as Mrs Delaney's should never be forgotten and should serve as a reminder to people that human beings should never be treated this was ever again. The total lack of respect for the dead interfered with rites of passage and cut across cultural and religious values and beliefs.
In summing up it is obvious that not only was the gymnasium inappropriate as mortuary, the behaviour of those in charge was also wholly inappropriate. The crass insensitivity highlighted by the words of Mrs Delaney is further illustrated by the observation of a priest present in the gymnasium until the early evening:
"At five o'clock in the gymnasium there was row after row of bodies and all around the walls there were police officers sitting down eating chicken legs."
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:51:52 GMT
The Immediate Aftermath - 5. The Hospitals
Some of the dead were taken to the two main hospitals and there were some victims who died in hospital. The hospitals had to deal with a large number of injured people as well as those searching for relatives and friends. At the Northern General people were directed to a canteen to wait. A volunteer social worker commented:
"It was filled with people in various states of distress…some people were sitting at tables, some were standing up, some were banging walls, others were just numb."
One bereaved father waiting for news of his missing son explained:
"The Assistant Hospital Administrator came in and stood on a table and started reading descriptions out of people in the mortuary."
This is how some people realised their loved ones were dead:
" He started to reel off information…as he did people were collapsing like dominoes."
The Hospital Administrator would later admit privately to researchers that he had undertook this insensitive method of informing the waiting people. In fact when interviewed he broke down and cried at the mistakes he and others had made.
The formal policing that went on in the hospitals was also insensitive. One mother who had been told that her daughter was in the hospital mortuary was told when she went to see her that she couldn't. When she remonstrated with the police officer she was told:
"That body is the property of the coroner."[sic]
6. Hammerton Road Boys' Club A disused boys' club became a 'holding' area for relatives. This decision seems to have been based on the fact that it was opposite the police station and was therefore convenient for the police. The lack of facilities in the club hardly rendered it suitable otherwise. People would wait at the club before being taken to the police station to give details of the person they were looking for. As with the hospitals and gymnasiums misinformation was rife here also.
7. The Medico - Legal Centre The Medico - Legal Centre in Sheffield is combined of the city mortuary, the department of Pathology and the Coroner's Court. Following the decision made at the ground to use the gymnasium as a temporary mortuary, the first body did not arrive at the Medico - Legal Centre until 10.06p.m.(Saturday) The last body was received 6.05a.m.(Sunday). Bereaved families have been very vocal in criticising the identification procedure both at the gymnasium and the city mortuary. At the Medico - Legal Centre people were distressed at only being allowed to view bodies behind a glass screen. The fact that they could not touch or hold their loved ones has had a profound influence on the bereaved.
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:52:37 GMT
The Immediate Aftermath - 5. The Response in Liverpool As the Disaster unfolded the atmosphere in Liverpool developed into one of overwhelming collective grief. Most people knew 'someone' who was or might be there. Those who had seen off their loved ones that morning watched and listened anxiously for news.
Although emergency numbers were being given out most were unable to get through to Sheffield and many decided to make the journey across the Pennines to find out for themselves whether their loved ones were alive or dead. Hundreds of people waited at Lime St Station for returning trains.
The city mourned its' dead and the sorrow was almost tangible. In the days that were to follow, the same people translated that grief into a spectacular tribute to the dead when the Anfield ground was turned into a floral shrine.
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:53:53 GMT
The Media Reaction Media coverage of Hillsborough has had significant consequences on a number of levels. This section will argue how the media informed and potentially influenced the outcome of legal cases. It will also be argued that the consequences were far reaching by attacking, not only those involved in the Disaster but Liverpool in general, adding to the already negative reputation of its people.
The coverage of the Hillsborough Disaster brought a barrage of complaints to the door of the Press Council. However all this succeeded in doing was highlighting the inadequacy of the Press Council as a medium for dealing with complaints.
The Hillsborough Disaster occurred in an historical media framework that already labelled Liverpool as rebellious and anarchistic. The 1980's were the heady days of the Militant dominated council in the city. Not only the Thatcher government but also the Labour party under Neil Kinnock waged war on the leaders of the City Council (Derek Hatton and co). In reality they were waging war on the people of Liverpool - they became the real victims as they suffered the direct consequences of harsh measures imposed but also as they gained an undeserved negative reputation not only nationwide but internationally as well. It was this context which enabled the media to act so appallingly in relation to the Hillsborough Disaster.
The immediate reaction of the press following Hillsborough was to blame the fans. The proof is there for all to see and it extends way beyond the Sun's headlines. However as that headline is the most shocking even to this day it is only right that we remind people what they said:
The Truth; some fans picked pockets of victims; some fans urinated on the brave cops; some fans beat up PC giving kiss of life.
This was the front page of the Sun newspaper on the Wednesday following the Disaster. The question that has to be asked is where did the paper obtain its 'evidence' from - all routes lead back to South Yorkshire Police and the Lie Machine that was being put into operation.
The response to this headline on Merseyside was one of outrage - thousand of copies were stolen and burnt and there followed a successful boycott campaign of the paper.
To the present day that paper is still hated in the city of Liverpool and beyond and there are still shopkeepers that refuse to sell.
Responsibility for peddling lies goes beyond the Sun. By the time that article was published there had been four days of offence reporting, nearly all blaming the fans. As early as 3.40pm as the Disaster was unfolding, BBC radio Two reported:
Unconfirmed reports that a door was broken down at the end that was holding Liverpool supporters.
Graham Kelly, the Chief Executive of the Football Association, interviewed by Radio Two in answer to a question regarding the gates, inferred that the police had not ordered the gates to be opened. Later, the reporter stated that he had obtained information from Graham Mackrell, the secretary of Sheffield Wednesday FC who had spoken to "the police officer in charge" and the situation was:
...at ten to three there was a surge of fans at the Leppings lane end of the ground… the surge composed of about 500 Liverpool fans and the police say that a gate was forced and that led to a crush in the terracing area - well under capacity I'm told, there was still plenty of room inside that area… It is important to note " police say". Here you have a situation which has to be interpreted as the police deliberately lying as we know that the police ordered the gate to be opened.
By 6pm that evening Radio 4 stated: Many reports speak of people without tickets having pushed their way in. So the scene had been set and the conspiracy had begun - Liverpool fans, angry at having no tickets had forced their way into the ground with disastrous consequences:
It's clear that many hundreds of Liverpool fans travelled to Hillsborough even though they didn't have tickets for the game. Shortly before the match started it appears that these fans were able to get into the ground through a gate at the Leppings Lane end. One report says the gate was kicked down...
The main culprits in spreading these lies were David Duckenfield, Chief Superintendent in charge on the day (who later admitted that he lied), Graham Mackrell, Secretary Sheffield Wednesday and Graham Kelly of the F.A. By the evening of the Disaster, Peter Wright, Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, issued a statement which acknowledged that the gate had been opened on the instructions of the police. Little notice was taken of this however, and other comments by Wright stated that the crush had occurred outside the turnstiles: By the late arrival of large numbers of people. This showed that Wright was merely operating a more sophisticated and subtle method of blaming the fans.
Amongst the most vicious of reports of the Disaster was the Sheffield Star and the Yorkshire Post. It should be noted that these would be the two most widely read papers in the Sheffield area and therefore it would be hard to select a jury for the inquests that had not been influenced in some way by their version of the 'facts'. The Sheffield Star reported:
Many supporters were still propping up the bars at 2.30pm. They raced to the stadium arriving at the Leppings Lane end at the height of the crush. Some of them were the worse for drink, others without tickets were hoping to sneak in. Hubble bubble toil and trouble.. drunkenness and ticketlessness were now added to the equation. The Yorkshire Post continued the attack: Thousands of fans began the fatal charge… thousands of latecomers tried to force their way into the ground...
The military language was a popular theme throughout the reporting of the Hillsborough Disaster. The scum Evening News was typical: The Anfield Army charged on to the terrace behind the goal - many without tickets.
Whilst the content and quality of so much of the reporting is appalling, the Evening Standard is deserving of particular consideration for it perfectly highlights the stereotyping not just of football fans but Liverpool people generally:
How long will it take for it publicly to be acknowledged that fans themselves share the blame?… The catastrophe was caused first and foremost by violent enthusiasm for soccer, in this case the tribal passions of Liverpool supporters. They literally killed themselves and others to be at the game.
This view was echoed at an international level in the comments of Jacques Georges, President of UEFA. His view of Liverpool fans was damning:
One had the impression that they were beasts waiting to charge into the arena.
Surprisingly one of the most offensive reports came from much closer to home, the Liverpool Daily Post. An article written by John Williams and entitled: "I blame the yobs" warrants extensive quoting:
So it was at Hillsborough that the yobs made enough nuisance of themselves to convince the police that so-called gates of Hell were opened… the gatecrashers wreaked their fatal havoc. At best it was unfettered zeal. At worst it was uncontrolled fanaticism and mass hysteria which literally squeezed the life out of men, women and children. This was yobbism at its most base. People without tickets who had no right to be there were crushing to death their fellow Scousers. When it comes to apportioning blame, the accusatory finger can also be pointed at Liverpool. Scouse killed Scouse for no better reason than 22 men were kicking a ball.
Given that this journalist was working locally you might think that he would be more likely to have his finger on the pulse. Apparently not.
Neither was this some bizarre response to a disaster, written in a state of shock. In spite of a barrage of complaints the author stood "by every word with no apology". In fact he went on to write a second article reaffirming the contents of the first and also referring to "those who so thoughtlessly took lives away". This article by Williams was in stark contrast to one written in the same paper by Brian Reade only a day earlier and poignantly entitled:" DEAD BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T COUNT". Reade correctly challenged the dangers of stereotyping fans as yobs stating:
...society had been happy to live with the myth that every football fan is a potential criminal. Well, nearly 100 people have just paid the price for this woeful misconception.
The media was drip fed sound bites by the police. The Daily Mail reported Paul Middup, spokesperson for the Police Federation, as saying:
I am sick of hearing how good the crowd were...They were arriving tanked up on drink and the situation faced by the officers trying to control them was quite simply terrifying.
The Sheffield Star was at the forefront of publishing serious allegations from the police:
FANS IN DRUNKEN ATTACKS ON POLICE: Ticketless thugs staged crush to gain entry… attacked an ambulanceman, threatened firemen and punched and urinated on policemen as they gave the kiss of life to stricken victims.
Television news also made great play of comments made by the Police Federation:
Sheffield police officers claimed tonight that drunkenness amongst Liverpool fans was at least partly responsible for the disaster at Hillsborough…According to the Police Federation a large number of Liverpool fans arrived at the ground late after drinking heavily and police couldn't control them.
It seemed as if all South Yorkshire Police officers were giving interviews left, right and centre - all leading to the same kind of headline. The Times reported: Drunkenness and hooliganism were a major factor in the Hillsborough Disaster, police said yesterday.
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:54:49 GMT
Controlling the Aftermath of Hillsborough
In the aftermath of Hillsborough there followed a degree of organisation which attempted to control every aspect of the Disaster. In this sense the Hillsborough Disaster serves as an example of how society operates in that every aspect of an individuals life is controlled - even in death. Several agencies played a crucial role in policing the bereaved and survivors of the Disaster.
1. Hillsborough Steering Committee Of Solicitors The swiftness with which the steering group of solicitors was set up is potentially indicative of one of two things. Either there was a genuine desire on the part of the legal system to assist the bereaved and survivors or it was felt that there was the need to organise at a legal level and control potential litigation. Given the long term consequences of the legal representation then it is obvious that the latter was the case.
The Steering Committee was conceived on the Sunday morning following the Disaster when a Home Office Representative came to Liverpool and met with members of the Law Society. What subsequently followed amounts to the most perverse example of 'ambulance chasing'. In some cases bereaved families were visited almost immediately after the Disaster by a leading city solicitor who offered them his condolences and signed them up. The insidious nature of this behaviour cannot be underestimated. For many families, it was only when they received a letter several weeks from the solicitor did they then recall the initial visit and what had happened. As one Mother said: "Someone just put something in front of me and said 'sign'. I didn't know what I was doing and I didn't care. All I wanted was my son back". Of course those involved in the setting up of the Steering Committee would argue that by centralising everything they were trying to minimise distress. A lot of families would disagree.
The Hillsborough Steering Group was formed out of the 50 families who were representing 92 bereaved families. The key issue here is one of control. The steering Committee was effectively able to control most of the litigation in respect of Hillsborough and negotiate on behalf of the dead as if they were one. The experience of families in respect of this has led to most saying that with hindsight and experience they would not go down that road again. Yet this has to be set in the context of the time. Pannone - Napier had pioneered group representation and presented it as a logical way to proceed when dealing with multiple actions. However, the outcome of all the litigation in respect of Hillsborough clearly shows that group representation worked against the families. If the inquests are taken as just one example, it can be seen that one person cannot adequately represent the specific details of all those supposedly being represented. The individual family and most importantly, the individual deceased was lost within the broader picture. It therefore became easier to fudge issues and evidence which clearly could have led to different verdicts. It is a widely held view that the Hillsborough Steering Committee was put in place to control Hillsborough litigation and moreover that they actively worked against their clients namely the bereaved and survivors of Hillsborough. Eleven years on in the region of 200 survivors currently have professional negligence cases against their original solicitors who were part of the Steering Committee.
It should be acknowledged that although many families voiced concern about their representation from early on most felt powerless to alter that situation. However, Maureen and Dave Church (mother of Gary) and Joan McBrien (mother of John ) stand apart in this respect. Both of these families rejected the steering committee as an adequate vehicle for representing their needs. The Church family rejected representation by the Steering Committee after a time because of their experience to date . Similarly Joan McBrien, unhappy with the representation at the mini inquests chose to represent her own family at the resumed inquests. The courageousness of these two families in standing alone at this time should never be underestimated and they should be applauded for the stance that they took. They paved the way for others to confront the inadequacies of group representation in the longer run.
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:55:43 GMT
Controlling the Aftermath of Hillsborough 2. Social Services In the aftermath of the Disaster, Liverpool Social Services set up a 'Hillsborough Team' of social workers who were located in what became known as the Hillsborough Centre - a building on the edge of Stanley Park, Anfield.
The social workers were assigned to specific bereaved families and also to survivors. They were a link between the families and many of the agencies involved in the aftermath. So, for example, they would liase between their clients and the investigating officers in respect of court hearings etc. in reality they had most involvement in the time leading up to the inquests.
In theory the role of the social workers should have been crucial to those most affected by the disaster as they were in an impartial body who could alleviate the tensions and sufferings of many by accessing information more easily. In practice the Hillsborough Centre and the Hillsborough Social workers became yet a further agency of control over the victims of the disaster. This is not to say that there were not good social workers who genuinely had cared for the bereaved and survivors. However, there was a clearly a directive from Liverpool Social Services to the management team to co -operate with the investigating bodies even if it was to the detriment of the client group. There are numerous examples of information being with-held from those who should have been receiving it.
All indications were that Hillsborough social workers had a good working relationship with the West Midlands Police - the investigating force. On one level this is understandable. The police passed on details of dates and times when families needed to be in court for example, and social workers, at the mini - inquest stage would accompany families to the Sheffield Coroner's Court. Most people would agree that this is a positive role for a social worker to play. However, where criticism can be levelled is the degree to which social services took their lead from the police, taking their word as definitive. In fairness some social workers did recognise the value of others with more inquest knowledge and experience and sought their advice. However, when the West Midlands police refused to attend a meeting if such people were involved, social services acquiesced to the wishes of the police.
Survivors who regularly attended the Hillsborough Centre became increasingly frustrated at the lack of information they would receive and had to rely on outside interested bodies for information regarding court procedures in which they were to be involved. When the inquests were resumed for the final stage, a list was published of those who would be called to give evidence. Although the Hillsborough Centre was provided with such a list, social workers nevertheless, refused to tell survivors whether or not their names were on it.
At a management level there was very definitely a directive to steer the bereaved and survivors away from any groups or individuals who were challenging the emerging official version of events. Such people were deemed 'political' and therefore dangerous. The question is though, dangerous to whom? Even survivors who were more assertive and challenging were labelled and marginalised. One group of survivors who stated that they wished their group to meet without social workers being present were defined as awkward and troublesome with their meeting room being described as the 'lions' den'.
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Post by Redz on Apr 4, 2004 21:57:24 GMT
Controlling The Aftermath Of Hillsborough - The West Midlands police
The West Midlands police became the major investigating force for all inquiries into the Hillsborough Disaster. They:
Investigated the role of South Yorkshire Police in the Hillsborough Disaster. Provided the evidence that went to the Director of Public Prosecutions which led to the decision that there was 'insufficient evidence' to bring about a prosecution. Provided the evidence that went to the Coroner's Court and acted as Officers to the Coroner when a verdict of 'Accidental Death' was recorded against all the dead of Hillsborough. The true role of the West Midlands Police in the Hillsborough Disaster is crucial to any serious history of events. They were brought in 'to do a job' and they utilised all their well honed 'skills' in the process. The 'First Tuesday' documentary gives some idea of the scale of the operation and the vast amount of evidence that had to be gathered and collated. However, there is another version of the work of the WMP which is far more sinister.
Shortly after the disaster the WMP set up offices on Merseyside in order to be close to those they had to interview. They entered Merseyside with a brief - to restore confidence in the police. These were professionals brought in to do a professional job. One of the reasons they stood out was that they were extremely well dressed. This was commented on by a number of people interviewed by them. Their sartorial elegance was no accident however. As one senior officer confided: 'Our boss said get in there and do a good job - we were given a clothing allowance and unlimited overtime'. Sadly, in many cases it worked. They operated a personal touch and many families were on first name terms with their officer. Others however, saw beyond the Armani suits and smelt the sows' ear beneath the silk purse. They realised that they were having a job done on them.
People were visited and revisited in attempts to create the appropriate picture of events. Survivors were pressured and browbeaten until some doubted their own experiences. Whilst there are numerous examples that could be given, the two which follow highlight the sinister role of this force and serve as justification for calls for an inquiry into their role.
a) Detective Superintendent Stanley Beechey Detective Superintendent Stan Beechey played a crucial role in the Hillsborough Disaster. He was constantly by the side of the South Yorkshire Coroner, Dr Stefan Popper throughout the course of the inquests. Although Mervyn Jones, the Assistant Chief Constable of West Midlands was officially the Coroners officer, Beecheys' role became increasingly significant.
Serious questions have to asked as to why Stan Beechey was still even in the police force let alone playing a crucial role in such a mjor investigation. Stan Beechey was a former head of the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad. Under his leadership there were numerous cases unsuccessfully prosecuted where there was clearly evidence of fabrication of evidence, confessions obtained under duress and the planting of forensic evidence to name just three examples - there are plenty more. The fact that anyone connected with the Serious Crime Squad should be allowed to be involved in any investigation seriously calls into questions the motives of those charged with employing them.
In January 1989, some three months before the Hillsborough Disaster, , Clare Short MP was calling in the House of Commons for an inquiry into the alleged malpractices of the West Midlands Police. She stated:
No solicitor in Birmingham would say anything other than that the [West Midlands Police] serious crime squad is fundamentally dishonest. The men in the squad decide who are guilty and frame them.
Eventually the situation became untenable, even for the police and in August 1989, the Chief Constable of West Midlands, Geoffrey Dear was forced to disband the squad, in the face of mounting evidence of corruption. Officers were either suspended or transferred to 'non-operational' duties. Stan Beechey was transferred to study the 'technical aspects of Hillsborough'. The average person might question what skills could Beechey possibly bring to investigating Hillsborough when his own force was so discredited. Their suspicions would later be confirmed when Beechey was subsequently charged with falsifying documents and perverting the course of justice.
George Tomkins was someone who suffered at the hands of Stan Beechey. He spent eighteen months in Winson Green prison before being acquitted of an armed robbery charge. Beechey was not only instrumental in framing George Tomkins but also colluded with a known criminal by offering inducements and inciting him to commit robbery.
From the time of his release George Tomkins set about gathering evidence to prove that he had been framed. What he found was remarkable. Beechey operated with a 'tout' who he assisted in setting up an armed robbery. He was instrumental in securing a car for the tout and was also aware that the robbers would have guns. It was Beechey who suggested to the tout that he would have to put a name in the hat as a suspect. The tout named George. The robbery took place in Leamington Spa at a time when George Tomkins was in Liverpool and could prove he was in Liverpool. It made no difference. He was arrested and spent eighteen months on remand. George spent ten years fighting to get Beechey and fellow officers into court.
b) Kevin Williams Kevin Williams was a fifteen year old boy who died in the Hillsborough Disaster. When his parents attended his mini - inquest, one police officer indicated to them in private that there was evidence of a woman police officer which stated that Kevin had said a word before he died. Anne Williams, Kevins' mother was so distressed by this information that when she went into court the procedure went by her in a haze. What she did not know at the time was that the West Midlands Police and the Coroner had the statements of two police officers which clearly indicated that Kevin was alive well after the time that he was allegedly dead.
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